Lesson 9 · The five universals II: accidents, predication, kinds of universal
Source: Book pp. 33–37; S4 slide 10.
1. Essential and accidental
Using Aristotle's definitions (from Porphyry's Isagoge, which the book follows):
- Essential (dhātī): a predicate that makes up the subject's essence. Either it is the whole essence ("human" said of Zayd) or a part of it ("animal" or "rational" said of human). So species, genus and differentia are all essential.
- Accidental (ʿaraḍī): a predicate outside the essence, which attaches to the thing once its essence is already complete. "Capable of laughter" said of human.
2. The two accidental universals
The slide's two examples: "হাসি" (laughing) and "হাঁটা" (walking).
| Khāṣṣa (S4: ʿāraḍī khāṣ, "specific") | ʿAraḍ ʿāmm (S4: ʿāraḍī ʿām, "general") | |
|---|---|---|
| What it is | an accident that belongs to this kind only | an accident found in this kind and others |
| Example for human | capable of laughter; a poet | walking; breathing |
- A khāṣṣa may cover the whole kind (every human can laugh) or only part of it (only humans are poets, but not every human is one).
- The same accident can change role: walking is a khāṣṣa of animal (only animals walk) but an ʿaraḍ ʿāmm of human (horses walk too). Being coloured is a khāṣṣa of bodies, yet it is a genus for "white" and "black". So "essential" and "accidental" are always relative to a given subject.
- Accidents and differentiae can be simple ("capable of laughter") or compound ("walking upright on two legs" for human).
Book term: the translation calls the khāṣṣa a "concomitant accidental". Do not confuse it with lāzim (inseparable accident) below; "concomitant" usually translates lāzim.
The five universals at a glance
| Universal | Essential or accidental | Answers |
|---|---|---|
| Nawʿ (species) | essential (the whole essence) | "what is it?" (about individuals of one reality) |
| Jins (genus) | essential (shared part) | "what is it?" (about different realities) |
| Faṣl (differentia) | essential (distinguishing part) | "what sort of thing is it in its essence?" |
| Khāṣṣa | accidental, unique to the kind | "what sort of thing is it in its accidents?" |
| ʿAraḍ ʿāmm | accidental, shared with others | no question of this kind |
3. Lāzim and mufāriq: inseparable and separable accidents
- Lāzim (inseparable): cannot be separated from the thing, even in thought. "Odd" for three: take oddness away and it is no longer three.
- Mufāriq (separable): can be separated in thought, even if it never actually is. Standing,
sitting, blue eyes. Separable accidents are:
- permanent in practice: blue eyes;
- quick to go: the blush of shame, the pallor of fear;
- slow to go: youth.
Obvious and non-obvious lāzim
- Obvious in the narrow sense (bayyin bi'l-maʿnā al-akhaṣṣ): picturing the thing alone brings the lāzim to mind. (This is exactly the bond iltizām needs; Lesson 3.)
- Obvious in the broad sense (bayyin bi'l-maʿnā al-aʿamm): picture the thing, the lāzim and the relation between them, and certainty follows. "Two is half of four." Or: picture the obligatory prayer, wuḍūʾ, and how one depends on the other, and you judge that wuḍūʾ is as obligatory as the prayer.
- Non-obvious (ghayr bayyin): needs a proof. "The angles of a triangle equal two right angles."
4. Three distinctions in predication
The book answers three puzzles with three distinctions.
- Natural and conventional predication. Saying the wider of the narrower ("animal" of human, "human" of Muḥammad) is natural. Saying the narrower of the wider is not natural; it happens only by convention. So a species is predicated of its individuals, not of its genus.
- Primary and common predication (Lesson 6). The five universals are always predicated by common predication ("the human is an animal"). Only the full definition is predicated by primary predication ("the human is a rational animal").
- "It is it" and "it has it" (muwāṭāh and ishtiqāq). "The human is capable of laughter" says the subject is the predicate: this is the kind used in the five universals. "The human has laughter" says the subject possesses it. So, strictly, the khāṣṣa of human is "capable of laughter", not "laughter"; we cannot say "the human is laughter".
5. Logical, natural and rational universals
When we say "human is a universal", three things are in play:
| What it is | Where it exists | |
|---|---|---|
| Natural universal (ṭabīʿī) | "human" just as human, the thing described | outside, through its individuals |
| Logical universal (manṭiqī) | "universal" just as universal: "what can apply to many" | only in the mind |
| Rational universal (ʿaqlī) | "human-as-universal", the two taken together | only in the mind |
Whatever exists outside the mind is always a particular. The same three-way split applies to species, genus and the rest.
ʿAqīda link: shared names, unshared realities. When we say "Allah is All-Knowing" and "Zayd is knowing", the shared word "knowing" is a universal, and a universal as universal exists only in the mind. Outside the mind there is Allah's knowledge, particular to Him and befitting Him, and Zayd's knowledge, particular to Zayd, with nothing out there that they share. So affirming the same name does not mean affirming the same reality, and it does not lead to likening Allah to creation (tashbīh). This point is central to how the scholars of ʿaqīda discuss the divine names and attributes.
Quiz 9
- Essential or accidental, for "human"? a) rational b) capable of laughter c) animal d) walking
- Khāṣṣa or ʿaraḍ ʿāmm? a) "capable of laughter" for human b) "walking" for human c) "walking" for animal d) "black" for crow
- How can "being coloured" be accidental to one thing and essential to another?
- Lāzim or mufāriq? a) "even" for four b) "standing" for Zayd c) "blue" for a blue eye d) "heat" for fire
- Which kind of "obvious" does iltizām need, and why?
- Why do we say the khāṣṣa of human is "capable of laughter" and not "laughter"?
- Which of the three universals (natural, logical, rational) exists outside the mind, and how?
- Explain in your own words why affirming "All-Knowing" for Allah and "knowing" for a human does not mean likening the two.
- Review: what is the differentia of "animal"?
Show answers
- a) essential (differentia) · b) accidental (khāṣṣa) · c) essential (genus) · d) accidental (ʿaraḍ ʿāmm)
- a) khāṣṣa · b) ʿaraḍ ʿāmm · c) khāṣṣa · d) ʿaraḍ ʿāmm (other things are black too)
- Being coloured is outside the essence of a body (an accident, in fact a khāṣṣa of bodies), but it is the genus of "white" and "black", so it is part of their essence.
- a) lāzim · b) mufāriq · c) mufāriq (permanent in practice, yet separable in thought) · d) lāzim
- Obvious in the narrow sense: picturing the meaning alone must bring the companion to mind with no middle step.
- Because in the five universals the predicate must be one with the subject ("it is it"). A human is not "laughter"; he is "capable of laughter". "Laughter" is only predicated in the "it has it" sense.
- The natural universal, through its individuals. But what exists outside is always particular: this human, that human.
- The shared word is a universal concept, which exists only in the mind. Outside the mind, each one's knowledge is particular to its owner and befits him, so nothing is actually shared out there.
- Sensing (and moving by will).